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Abstract— This paper considers an electric vehicle charging
scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time
in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed
to explicitly express their preferences over different start times
and the length of charging periods for charging their vehicles.
The goal is to compute optimal charging schedules that maximize
the social welfare of all users given their time preferences
and the state of charge of their vehicles. Assuming that users are
self-interested agents who may behave strategically to advance
their own benefits rather than the social welfare of all agents,
we propose an iterative auction, which computes high-quality
schedules and, at the same time, preserves users’ privacy by
progressively eliciting their preferences as necessary. We conduct
a game theoretical analysis on the proposed iterative auction to
prove its individual rationality and the best response for agents.
Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that the iterative
auction can achieve high-efficiency solutions with a partial value
information. Additionally, we explore the relationship between
scheduling efficiency and information revelation in the auction.
Index Terms— Electric vehicle (EV), charging scheduling, iter-
ative bidding, start time, preference revelation, social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
ELECTRIC Vehicle (EV) users and manufacturers agreethat the ability for convenient and rapid charging is
key to persuading drivers to go green. Compared to internal
combustion engine vehicles, the driving range of EVs for
a single charge is around one-third of the petrol-equivalent,
while the recharging time can be hours, compared to minutes
at a gas station [1]. Convenient and fast recharging services
thus become essential for EV users to alleviate their range
anxiety [2]. Public charging networks, such as ChargePoint
or The Electric Circuit, can greatly extend EV driving range
by providing first-come-first-serve charging services. However,
this uncoordinated management may cause congestion and
long waiting time at peak hours [3], which in turn negatively
impacts charging resources utilization and users’ satisfaction.
Therefore, it is of great importance to schedule multiple users’
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requests based on their private preferences in terms of start
times and charging duration in advance, such that charging
network utilization efficiency and user satisfaction can be
maximized.
In this paper, we address a charging scheduling problem in
a decentralized reservation setting, in which users with strict
time requirements can express their preferences and reserve
their charging time based on their State of Charge (SoC).
Reservations can be made to achieve two main objectives:
Improve users’ satisfaction: Reservations can guarantee the
availability of charging facility at users’ reserved time. A high
preference for reservation is expected by the users who have
more strict time requirements for their charging, such that
they can integrate charging with their daily activities and
reduce the traveling time for finding an available charging
point. Moreover, reservation is also important for long distance
travel, as it enables users to reserve their preferred time at
the highway charging stations before departure, such that they
can recharge as planned on the road [4]. In such a highway
scenario, reservation can reduce waiting time at charging
stations and total travelling time to destination [5], [6].
Improve charging resource utilization: Reservations can
eliminate the conflicts among the multiple charging requests in
advance and, at the same time, achieve an efficient utilization
of the limited space and power at the charging stations [7], [8].
Up to now, the growth of publicly accessible chargers, espe-
cially the fast chargers, still falls behind the increase in the
number of EVs on the road. The reason could be attributed
to the large costs of charging facility investment and long
payback period [9]. In this situation, reservation can be a
good solution to accommodate more EVs with the limited
charging capacities [10], [11], adjust the expected profit and
task declining cost [12], and make more profits for charging
stations [13]. Moreover, reservations can also play a key
role in alleviating the adverse impacts of charging activities
on grid reliability and stability, as discussed in [14]–[16].
It can also contribute to charging infrastructure planning and
management by reducing the required number of charging
points and improving the charging station’s profits [17], [18].
The decentralized approach is justified by users’ self-
interested behaviors that may yield negative consequences
to the social welfare and the utilization efficiency in the
charging network [25]. Decentralized charging scheduling
needs significant inputs from the self-interested users, thus the
solution quality depends heavily on the charging requests and
preferences gathered from them. However, self-interested users
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may reveal incomplete, or perhaps untruthful information,
about their preferences, if that leads to an individually prefer-
able outcome. In this case, these strategic and economical
rationality may lead to non-optimal solutions and jeopardize
the social welfare. Given this, game theory and auctions
are to capture the conflicting economic interests between
network utilization efficiency and social welfare maximization
with the presence of self-interested users in the decentralized
environment. In addition, the computational complexity puts
additional challenge in producing feasible schedules, as the
charging scheduling problem tackled in this paper is NP-hard.
In this case, the problem may be solved in a decentralized
reservation setting by means of market mechanisms addressing
users’ strategic behaviors.
In this paper, we solve an electric vehicle charging schedul-
ing problem as an iterative bidding process in a decentralized
day-ahead setting, which can be applied in different scenar-
ios, such as highway, shopping mall, or hospitals, etc. This
multilateral bidding framework allows the self-interested users
to iteratively negotiate with others on the charging time and
the prices. And they are allowed to progressively reveal their
preferences over different start times as necessary. Given users’
private preferences and assuming all requests are available
at the beginning of decision making horizon, the iterative
bidding framework computes a social-welfare solution with
the minimum preference elicitation.
To be specific, our work contributes to the existing literature
in the following two ways:
(1) We formulate the decentralized charging scheduling as a
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) in a stand along charging
station system, which resolves the selection issue from the
limited charging space and users’ available time window. This
mathematical formulation introduces novel decision variables
and constraints to the parallel machine (Pm) scheduling model
while delivering a continuous-time solution to the problem.
(2) We devise an iterative bidding framework based on
game theory and mechanism design to solve this charging
scheduling problem. We have conducted both game theoretical
analysis and extensive simulations to validate its performance.
The results have demonstrated (i) the generalized game the-
oretical properties, including individual rationality and the
best response for agents; (ii) the performance on numerical
experiments, where iterative bidding achieves on average 85%
of efficiency under a partial information revelation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows,
Section II studies the related works on EV charging schedul-
ing. Section III describes the charging scheduling problem and
presents its mathematical formulation. Section IV illustrates
the implementation of the iterative bidding framework for
the decentralized problem, and its game theoretical properties.
Section V presents a computational study to test the perfor-
mance of the proposed iterative bidding framework. Finally,
Section VI draws a conclusion and outlooks the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The current charging scheduling problems addressed in
the literature can be sub-classified according to the decision
variable into two main groups, the first group (a) is charging
period and space allocation, which decides where and when
to activate the charging demands taking into account the
predefined deadlines and energy requirements [3]–[5], [19];
and the second group (b) is energy management, which
decides the amount of energy units can be allocated to
each plug-in EV during each time slot in distribution
networks [23], [27]–[29]. Some works model the day-ahead
dispatching and real-time energy management as a two-stage
charging scheduling problem and solve it through stochastic
programming [31], [32], [34], [35]. The objective is to
minimize the load mismatch between day-ahead and real-time
market. In this paper, we address a charging scheduling
problem with the limited charging space, in which the energy
management issue and charging impacts on the stability of
distribution network are neglected. The classification of EV
charging scheduling problems is summarized in Table I.
Based on this classification method, the whole optimization
process in real-time energy management or online auction
design of charging scheduling often adopts discrete-time
model, which splits the time period into a series of units
and allocates the power at each unit [21], [22], [30]. This
is more flexible for real-time power control with the potential
of accommodating dynamics. However, the mathematical pro-
grams for discrete-time problems are usually of much larger
sizes and require more computational efforts to solve than
the continuous one. Moreover, continuous-time model can
take place at any point in the continuous domain of time. In
this paper, we build a continuous-time, offline model for the
charging scheduling problem without considering the dynamic
events during optimization process. This research provides
the first baseline for deterministic scenarios while robustness
against uncertainties and dynamics may be further addressed
in our future work.
Most energy management problems assume charging sta-
tions have enough service points to accommodate all charging
requests [17], [31], [32], which is impractical in real-world
scenarios. This paper aims to relieve the range anxiety in
public charging station by allocating reserved charging space
for users with preferences. Moreover, compared to the decision
variables and constraints in traditional Pm models, we consid-
ered users’ restricted time window for charging and added a
selection decision variable on each constraint. The objective
is refined to maximize users’ value on the start time, instead
of minimizing only the total completion time. This allows us
to optimize the valuation, not just the duration, of time for the
EV users based on their practical demands and preferences.
Among the solving techniques, games and auctions are
widely applied to address the social welfare issue in decentral-
ized charging scheduling [36]. However, two gaps exist in the
current researches: First, most of the existing works tackling
space or energy reservation does not consider the decentralized
nature of the charging scheduling problem. They focus on
the mathematical programming based approaches, instead of
on the market based mechanisms, as discussed in [13], [19],
[20], [37], [38]. From another aspect, market mechanisms are
frequently applied in a discrete time and dynamic charging
scheduling environment [11], [23], [39], [40], rather than in
the continuous time and reservation environment. Second,
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXISTING WORKS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLE CHARGING SCHEDULING
more efforts should be put into developing efficient market
mechanisms with privacy preservation for decentralized charg-
ing scheduling problems. Current works focus on applying
Stackelberg game [23] and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
auction [27]: Stackelberg game aims to analyze and predict the
potential outcomes of the leader-follower interaction, however,
we should develop a mechanism for EV charging scheduling
with the bidding and payment rule such that the desired
outcomes can arise naturally from the strategic interactions
among users; moreover, instead of forcing users to truthfully
report their private preferences through VCG mechanism,
we expect participants to gain greater utility by revealing less
privacy through an iterative bidding process [41].
III. CHARGING SCHEDULING PROBLEM
Charging scheduling is considered as a decentralized deci-
sion making process in which a charging station interacts with
a group of users. Each user has one charging request, which
consists of an available time window for charging, a preferred
start time and a required charging duration. Users have pref-
erences over different start times, expressed by values. In this
decentralized setting, users’ values are considered as private
information, which is not known by the charging station. The
charging station has a limited charging capacity restricted by
the number of charging points. The station shall then select a
subgroup of the charging requests and allocate charging space
and start times to these requests, such that the available time
windows of all selected requests are satisfied and the sum of
the values across all users is maximized. A nomenclature of
problem variables and parameters can be found in Table II.
Consider a charging scheduling scenario involving one
charging station with m charging points, and a set of n users,
denoted as N . The charging request of each user i ∈ N
TABLE II
NOMENCLATURE
is defined by a 4-tuple < ati , dti , psti , cdi >, where ati
is the earliest arriving time of user i , and dti is her latest
departure time. ati and dti indicate the earliest time that user i
can start to charge and the latest time by which she has to
finish, respectively; they constitute the available time window
of user i for charging. psti is the preferred start time of
user i , where ati ≤ psti ≤ dti − cdi . And cdi is the charging
duration needed for user i to reach her required SoC . cdi can
be computed by E ∗ (SoC ′ − SoC)/R, where E is the battery
capacity (kWh), SoC ′ and SoC are the required and the initial
state of charge, respectively, and R is the constant charging
rate (kW ) delivered at the charging station.
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A charging schedule contains the start times allocated to
the selected charging requests, and user will have a value for
schedule. We follow the private value model proposed in [42],
where user’s value is not dependent on other users’ values, and
each user knows her own value but not the values of others.
Valuation function v(·) measures how user is satisfied with the
start time st in the schedule through the monetary value. In our
model, we define user i ’s value as a function of start time sti
in the time window [ati , dti − cdi ]. For the preferred time
window [ati , psti ], vi (psti ) is the value that user i assigns to
the start time ati ≤ sti ≤ psti . For sti that is after psti and
within the time window (psti , dti − cdi ], it is also acceptable
but it will incur an extra cost to user i . That is, her value
vi (psti ) will be diminished based on the cost ci (sti ), which
is a non-decreasing function of start time sti . Therefore, for a
charging schedule, if user i starts to charge at sti , her value is
defined as vi (sti ) = vi (psti ) − ci (sti ). For her preferred time
window [ati , psti ], ci (sti ) = 0 and vi (sti ) = vi (psti ). User i
does not accept any charging schedule if the start time sti
allocated to her is before ati or the finish time sti + cdi is
after dti , i.e., user’s value vi (sti ) = 0.
As charging scheduling involves the charging request selec-
tion due to the limited charging capacity, then let Xi = 1
if user i is selected in the schedule, otherwise Xi = 0.
Moreover, let Y j,i = 1 if both users i and j (i, j ∈ N , i = j )
are selected in the schedule, and user i charges immediately
after j on a charging point, otherwise Y j,i = 0. Y j,i is the
precedence constraint for users i and j on a charging point,
combined with the selection issue. Note that there are two
implications for Y j,i = 0: First, if any of user i and j is
not selected, or neither of them is selected, Y j,i equals zero.
At this time, the unselected user should not be adjacent with
any other selected users, which indicates the unselected user is
removed from the charging scheduling process. Second, if both
of i and j are selected, but they are not adjacent, Y j,i = 0.
In addition, let Y0,i = 1 if user i is selected and the first
one to charge on a charging point, otherwise Y0,i = 0. Also
let Yi,n+1 = 1 if user i is selected and the last one to charge
on a charging point, otherwise Yi,n+1 = 0.
A centralized setting is first considered where the values of
users are assumed to be known by the charging station for
scheduling. The charging scheduling problem is formulated
as a mix-integer program, which involves the selection of
multiple charging requests such that the scheduling constraints
for all selected requests are satisfied and, at the same time,
the social welfare, i.e., the sum of the values across all selected
users, is maximized.
Mathematically, the centralized scheduling model solves:
max
n∑
i=1
Xi (vi (psti ) − ci (sti )) (1)
subject to
Xi ati ≤ sti ≤ dti − cdi + H (1 − Xi ) ∀i = 1, . . . , n
(2)
n∑
i=1
Xi Y0,i ≤ m (3)
∑
j∈{0}∪(N\{i})
Y j,i = Xi ∀i = 1, . . . , n (4)
∑
j∈{n+1}∪(N\{i})
Yi, j = Xi ∀i = 1, . . . , n (5)
Y j,i + Yi, j + H Xi + H X j ≤ 2H + 1
∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j (6)
st j + cd j + H Xi + H X j + H Y j,i ≤ sti + 3H
∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j (7)
Xi , Yi, j , Y0,i , Yi,n+1 ∈ {0, 1}
∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j (8)
sti ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n (9)
Constraint (2) ensures that the start time sti of a selected
user i should not be earlier than her arriving time ati , and the
finishing time sti + cdi should not be later than her departure
time dti . H is a large positive constant for the linearization
of the logical constraint “if”. Constraint (3) ensures that at
most m users can be selected as the first one to charge.
Constraint (4) enforces that a selected user i ’s charging should
either be the first one on a charging point, or after some other
users’. Constraint (5) enforces that a selected user i ’s charging
should either be the last one on a charging point, or before
some other users’. Moreover, constraint (4) and (5) denote
if user i is not selected, all decision variable Y j,i , Y0,i and
Yi,n+1 related to i should be set as zero. Similar usage
for constraint (4) and (5), as well as Y0,i and Yi,n+1, can
also be found in [38], [43], however, they did not involve
the selection issue in their modeling. Constraint (6) ensures
that if both users i and j are selected and adjacent, they
have one determined precedence sequence for charging, which
means one should charge either before or after the other one.
Constraint (7) ensures that if both users i and j are selected
and i charges immediately after j on a charging point, user i
does not start before j is completed. The domain of decision
variables Xi , Yi, j , Y0,i and Yi,n+1, as well as the start time sti ,
is defined in (8) and (9).
The centralized modeling allows us to gain a better under-
standing of this charging scheduling problem and extend it
to the decentralized setting for combinatorial optimization.
In particular, we had assumed that users’ preference values are
known by the charging station in the centralized optimization,
so it can obtain the same outcome as the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction, where each user is incentivized to
truthfully report their values. In next section, we will remove
this assumption in the decentralized setting and consider users’
values as private information. This allows us to focus on the
strategic interaction between the charging station and the users,
in which users may misreport their values if that can improve
their own benefits. In order to reflect this self-interested
property of users, we call them agents and propose an iterative
bidding framework to solve the decentralized problem.
IV. ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK
Iterative bidding is an auction-based approach containing
three major components: the bids, a winner determination
model, and an iterative bidding procedure. The bids allow
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agents to express their charging requests and prices. The
winner determination model takes agents’ bids as input to
solve the bid selection and charging scheduling to maximize
the sum of bidding prices. The iterative bidding procedure is an
interactive process for the charging station (auctioneer) and the
users to negotiate on the start times and prices in a systematic
way, through which the provisional charging schedule evolves
towards an optimal one.
The bidding process can be implemented on users’ smart
phones or other platforms, where users can set up their
preferences in advance to participate. After that, bidding is
executed automatically, and users need not to wait or bid
manually. In real-world applications, iterative bidding also
adds the potential of accommodating dynamic changes by
running multiple bidding events. If a user has any change of
charging requests, she may update her bids and participate in
the next bidding event.
We will elaborate on these three components through game
theoretical analysis with a worked example in the following.
A. Bids
During the strategic interaction with the auctioneer in iter-
ative bidding, an agent can often express her preferences over
different charging schedules through a conditional statement,
which involves the charging request, the start time and the
price. We use the atomic bid in [44] as a basis to represent
agents’ preferences in terms of these three elements. The bids
are defined as a 3-tuple < Q, lst, p >, where Q represents
the charging request of one agent that contains her arriving
time at and the required charging duration cd . lst is the latest
start time. And p represents the price that one agent is willing
to pay for request Q to be started before lst , which implies
the start time st is within the time window [at, lst].
The bids can be connected by XOR connective as XOR
bid [44], which enables agents to express their complete
preferences over different start times. XOR connective is an
operation over bids, enabling each user to submit an arbitrary
number of bid < Q, lst, p >, where implicitly an user is
willing to obtain at most one of these bids. For instance,
< Qi , lsti,1, pi,1 > XOR < Qi , lsti,2, pi,2 > indicates agent
i will pay pi,1 if she can start to charge before lsti,1 (the
allocated start time sti is before lsti,1), and pay pi,2 if she
can start to charge before lsti,2. Suppose agent i has wi bids
for the charging started after her preferred start time psti ,
i.e., psti < sti ≤ dti − cdi , then her full preferences can
be represented using the XOR bid: < Qi , lsti,0, pi,0 > XOR
< Qi , lsti,1, pi,1 > XOR, · · · , XOR < Qi , lsti,wi , pi,wi >,
simplified as XOR0≤k≤wi < Qi , lsti,k , pi,k >, where lsti,0 =
psti , p0 = vi (psti ), and lsti,wi = dti − cdi . Each agent
wants just one of her XOR bid to be selected in the schedule.
If we restrict the values of the start times to integers, XOR
bids have full expressiveness in representing agents’ values,
and we could formulate a linear winner determination model
with a finite set of start times. This is reasonable because
agents usually define their start times in terms of the number
of certain time units, such as hours, from the time when
they arrive. Given this, we have lsti,k = lsti,k−1 + 1, for
k = 1, . . . , wi .
In XOR bid, agents are assumed to be indifferent to the start
times within a certain time period, which indicates agents have
an equivalent value for the start time that is before one latest
start time. For instance, they may claim they would pay $5
if they can start to charge before 10 a.m., and would only
pay $3 if before 12 a.m.. In this way we turn the continuous
cost function of the centralized model into a step-wise price
function in the format of XOR bid, such that agents can express
their preferences on the limited, discretized time periods, and
bid with different latest start times. Using the value on the
latest start time to represent the preference over a period of
time, we are able to construct the linear winner determination
model taking the XOR bids as input.
B. Winner Determination Model
The winner determination task selects a subset of agents’
XOR bids such that its constraints are satisfied and, at the same
time, the sum of the bidding prices is maximized. Although
agents use the bidding prices to express their values over
different time windows, they will not necessarily reveal the
true values of their bids. The reason is that iterative bidding
is essentially a price system, rather than a direct revelation
mechanism, i.e., it does not require agents to reveal their
complete values, such that agents’ privacy is preserved. In such
system, rational and self-interested agents tend to partially
reveal their values in order to maximize their utility, thus
bidding prices do not necessarily correspond to agents’ values.
In agent i ’s bids, the bidding price pi (lsti,k ) for lsti,k is lower
than her value vi (lsti,k ) over the kth bid. The utility ui (lsti,k )
of agent i is the difference of her value and the bidding price,
i.e., ui (lsti,k ) = vi (lsti,k ) − pi (lsti,k ). We assume that agents
prefer an earlier start time, thus they have a higher value and
a higher bidding price for it. It can be seen that the bidding
price slopes downwards, i.e., pi,k−1 ≥ pi,k , for k = 1, . . . , wi .
In the winner determination model, we turn Xi (centralized
charging scheduling model) into the two-dimensional decision
variable Xi,k , where k = 0, . . . , wi , i = 1, . . . , n; and let
Xi,k = 1 if the kth bid of agent i is selected in the provisional
schedule st , otherwise Xi,k = 0. In other words, Xi,k = 1
indicates the charging for agent i starts before the latest start
time lsti,k in her kth bid. Taken the XOR bids as input, winner
determination maximizes the sum of the bidding prices across
all selected agents, which solves:
max
n∑
i=1
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k pi (lsti,k ) (10)
subject to
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n (11)
Xi,k ati ≤ sti ≤ lsti,k + H (1 − Xi,k )
∀k = 0, . . . , wi ; i = 1, . . . , n (12)
n∑
i=1
wi∑
k=0
Xi,kY0,i ≤ m (13)
∑
j∈{0}∪(N\{i})
Y j,i =
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k ∀i =1, . . . , n (14)
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∑
j∈{n+1}∪(N\{i})
Yi, j =
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k ∀i = 1, . . . , n
(15)
Y j,i + Yi, j +H
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k +H
w j∑
k′=0
X j,k′ ≤ 2H + 1
∀i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j (16)
st j +cd j +H Xi,k +H X j,k′+H Y j,i ≤ sti + 3H
∀k =0, . . . , wi , k ′ =0, . . . , w j ;
i, j =1, . . . , n, i = j (17)
Xi,k , Yi, j , Y0,i , Yi,n+1 ∈ {0, 1}
∀k = 0, . . . , wi ; i, j = 1, . . . , n, i = j
(18)
sti ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (19)
Unlike the centralized model, the winner determination
objective function is linear. Constraint (11) enforces that each
agent has at most one of its XOR bid selected in the provisional
schedule. Constraints (12)-(19) have a similar format and the
same purpose as (2)-(9) in the centralized model, except that
Xi,k becomes a two-dimensional decision variable.
C. Iterative Bidding Procedure
The iterative bidding procedure is shown as pseudo-code
in Algorithm 1. Each agent i first receives a reserve price
for charging before the preferred start time lsti,0 and any
other start times lsti,k , k = 1, . . . , wi . The reserve price is
a reference value reflecting the basic cost for the charging,
which includes the construction cost of charging stations,
the operational costs, and electricity fees. Any prices lower
than such reference are deemed invalid and will be rejected
by the auctioneer.
After setting up the reserve prices, agents use them as the
first-round bidding prices. At the beginning of round t − 1
(t > 1), agents compute the utility-maximizing bids among
all their bids. In order to do this, agent i solves the maxi-
mization problem maxk∈{0,1,...,wi }[vi (lsti,k )− pt−1i (lsti,k )] for
each of her bids, where pt−1i (lsti,k ) is the bidding price for
lsti,k at round t − 1. Note that these bids equally maximize
agents’ utility. That is, for any two bids k and k ′ in the
utility-maximizing bids, they have vi (lsti,k ) − pt−1i (lsti,k ) =
vi (lsti,k′ )− pt−1i (lsti,k′ ). After that, the agents join these bids
together as XOR bid and submit it to the auctioneer. The
auctioneer solves the winner determination using these XOR
bids as input at round t − 1, and sends the schedule st−1 of
round t − 1 back to the agents. At the beginning of round t ,
agents need to update the bidding prices for each of their start
times based on the schedule at round t −1. If one agent is not
included in st−1, she has three price-updating options:
• She can increase the bidding prices that she bidded at
round t − 1 or before by ε, where ε is the minimum
increment imposed by the auctioneer. Since the agents
are assumed to be rational, in general they do not bid
with an increment greater than ε;
• She can keep her bidding prices unchanged. In this case,
the auctioneer considers she has entered into the final bid
Algorithm 1 Iterative Bidding Framework
Require: N , XOR bids of all agents, ε
Ensure: s f inal ; // The final schedule
1: t ← 1; // t : round index
2: i sT erminated ← f alse; // termination index
3: Agent i ∈ N sets her ini tial bidding price;
4: while (¬i sT erminated) do // iterative bidding starts
5: for i = 1 → N do
6: if (t > 1 && (i i s not selected in st−1)) then
7: ∀ each of bids at round t − 1
8: do pti (lsti,k ) ← pt−1i (lsti,k ) + ε;
9: end if
10: Solve maxk∈{0,...,wi }[vi (lsti,k ) − pti (lsti,k )];
11: U pdate f inal state and join round t;
12: end for
13: Auctioneer : update isT erminated and do round t;
14: if (i sT erminated) then break;
15: end if
16: Solve st ← max
st∈St
∑
lsti,k∈st p
t
i (lsti,k );
17: Send bidding result st back to each i ∈ N;
18: t ← t + 1;
19: end while
20: Bidding ends and winners pay their bidding prices.
status, where she is forbidden from increasing the bidding
prices at any of her latest start times in future rounds;
• She can, of course, withdraw from the bidding process.
If one agent is included in the provisional schedule st−1,
she can maintain her bidding prices unchanged at round t ,
which means she is allowed to repeat her bids. After updating
the bidding prices, agents recompute their utility-maximizing
bids based on their values and the updated bidding prices, and
then join them as XOR bid for round t . The auctioneer allows
the agents to repeat their bids in the final round (bid repetition),
with the purpose of boosting the auctioneer’s revenue. During
the bidding process, some bids can be temporarily “excluded”
from the provisional schedule due to a particular combination
of scheduling constraints and charging requirements of other
bids with higher bidding prices. In the latter rounds, however,
the schedule may accommodate the previously excluded bids.
Once the bids are received from the agents, the auctioneer
first removes the invalid and final-status bids at the current
round, and then checks the termination condition against the
valid bids. The bidding terminates if there are no price updates
for all valid bids in this round, i.e., all agents that bid in the
last round have repeated their bids. If the termination condition
is satisfied, the auctioneer implements the final schedule and
the agents pay their bidding prices. Otherwise the auctioneer
takes the set of valid bids as input and solves the winner
determination for another round.
In winner determination, the auctioneer computes a new
provisional schedule at the current round as long as the bidding
is not terminated. At round t , the provisional schedule st
solves:
max
st∈St
∑
lsti,k ∈st
pti (lsti,k ), (20)
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where St is the set of all feasible schedules, given the valid
bids submitted at round t . The affiliation lsti,k ∈ st indicates
the start time sti allocated to agent i is before the latest start
time lsti,k in the provisional schedule st . And pti (lsti,k ) is
the bidding price that the agent wants to pay for the charging
started before lsti,k .
Although agents are not required to reveal their values
during the bidding process, the winner determination process
in each round and price updating policy prompt agents to
progressively reveal their complete value information and
extend their latest start times if they are not included in the
provisional schedule. At first round, agents always submit the
bids with their preferred start time lsti,0 due to its highest
utility. Note that agents have higher values and the correspond-
ing higher bidding prices on the earlier start times, and the
utility decreases as the start time delays, i.e., vi (lsti,k−1) −
pi (lsti,k−1) > vi (lsti,k ) − pi(lsti,k ), for k = 1, . . . , wi . If the
submitted bid with higher utility is not selected in this round,
agent has to increase its bidding price under the price updating
policy, in this case, the utility of this bid will decrease.
Therefore, the utility difference of the bid between preferred
start time lsti,0 and the later start times becomes smaller as the
bidding proceeds, as a result, the utility of the earlier and later
start time may become equivalent in latter rounds. It can be
inferred that by computing utility-maximizing bids, the price
updating policy prompts agent to provide more bids if she is
not selected in the provisional round. This value revelation
process will, to some extent, increase agents’ opportunity to
be selected in future rounds, however, it will cause a privacy
loss to the agents as well.
D. Worked Example
We take a test case from the numerical experiment (ten
agents and three charging points) as an example to illus-
trate the iterative bidding process. Appendix A presents the
charging requests, bids, reserve prices and values of these
10 agents. The detailed bidding process and result are shown
in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. Appendix B
presents the bids sent to the charging station, the provisional
winner bids and the objective value in each round.
As the bidding proceeds, the temporarily excluded agents
tend to extend their acceptable start times and submit more
bids to the auctioneer. For instance, agent No. 3 in Appendix B
is not selected in the first two rounds, thus she has to keep
increasing her bidding prices and submit more bids in next
round. At round #3, she sends five bids and is finally included.
Additionally, even though agent No. 5 sends her complete bids
at round #3 and #4, but she is not able to be selected in the
final schedule. Appendix B also reveals that some agents, such
as No. 4, 7, and 8, do not bid their complete values but are
always selected in schedule. The final schedule includes nine
(out of ten) agents with a total revenue of $64.
E. Properties of the Iterative Bidding Framework
As rational players, agents would like to be selected in the
final schedule and maximize their utilities. They behave strate-
gically and progressively reveal their values as the bidding
proceeds. In an auction setting, the strategy reflects how each
agent take actions to increase her own utility in response to
the strategies of other agents. In what follows, we will prove
two key properties held in the iterative bidding framework.
Property 1: Iterative bidding is individually rational.
Proof: Individual rationality holds if the agents can always
achieve as much expected utility from participation as with-
out participation, regardless of other agents’ strategies [45].
In other words, the expected utility accrued from participation
is non-negative. We prove by cases.
Case #1: If agent i is not selected in the schedule st−1 at
round t − 1 (t − 1 ≥ 1), she has three options: First, she
increases the price pt−1i (lsti,k ) by ε on the bids submitted in
round t − 1. Note that increasing the bidding price results in
utility loss. If one agent is not included in the schedule, she
will keep increasing her bidding prices in future rounds until
she is included or reaches her value. A rational agent does
not accept a negative utility, which means p f inali (lsti,k ) ≤
vi (lsti,k ), for 0 ≤ k ≤ wi . Second, she claims a final bid
status and quits all future rounds except the final one. As a
result, she may either be included in the final round with a
non-negative utility, or not be included with a zero utility.
Third, she withdraws from the bidding with a zero utility.
Case #2: If agent i is included in the schedule st−1 at round
t −1, she does not need to update her bids for next round. As a
rational agent, she will maintain her bidding prices unchanged
and repeat her bids at round t for greater utility.
Agents repeat their previous bids in the final round,
and those who have room to increase their bidding prices
are included in the final schedule s f inal . As a conse-
quence, they gain a positive utility in s f inal , because
maxk∈{0,1,...,wi }[vi (lsti,k ) − p f inali (lsti,k )] ≥ 0. Agents who
are not included in the previous rounds have to bid their
values, i.e., p f inali (lsti,k ) = vi (lsti,k ). Then by solving
maxk∈{0,1,...,wi }[vi (lsti,k ) − p f inali (lsti,k )], the agents are able
to send all their utility-maximizing XOR bids with zero utility
at the final round.
Add it all up, the mechanism ensures that each agent has
a non-negative utility from participation whatever the final
schedule is. Therefore, individual rationality holds. 
Property 2: The best response of each agent is to submit
her utility-maximizing XOR bids at each round.
Proof: The best response refers to an agent’s utility-
maximizing strategy across a restricted set of all possible
strategies [45]. In our case, the best-response strategy for each
agent in each round is to send the utility-maximizing XOR bids
after the price updating policy. We prove by cases.
Case #1: If agent i is not selected in the schedule st−1 at
round t − 1 (t − 1 ≥ 1), she has three strategies for round t:
First, she can update her current bids following the price
updating policy and send the utility-maximizing XOR bids
by solving maxk∈{0,1,...,wi }[vi (lsti,k ) − pt−1i (lsti,k )]. Second,
she can aggressively increase her bidding prices by a higher
increment ε′ than the specified ε (ε′ > ε). This may happen
when an agent believes that the competition is fierce, thus
bidding with minimum increment ε could not ensure she is
included in the future schedules. However, by doing this, she
will lose utility due to higher bidding prices and this aggressive
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strategy will not guarantee she is included in the schedule.
Third, she claims the final bid status. By doing this, it is
ensured that she will not lose her utility in all future rounds,
i.e., her utility is fixed as vi (lsti,k ) − pt−1i (lsti,k ) until the
bidding terminates. However, there is no guarantee that she
would be selected in the final round. From above, the best
response strategy for the excluded agents at round t − 1 is to
send their utility-maximizing XOR bids to the auctioneer.
Case #2: If agent i is included in the schedule st−1 at round
t − 1, she is allowed to repeat her bids at round t . Her utility
will not decrease in attending the next round. She, of course,
can aggressively increase her bidding prices, however, she
would lose utility. Therefore, a rational selected agent will
repeat her XOR bids of round t − 1.
To sum up, since the iterative bidding is individually ratio-
nal, the best response for each agent for the next round is
to submit her utility-maximizing XOR bids, regardless of the
strategies of other agents. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of iterative bidding
in terms of the efficiency, information revelation, computa-
tional time and accommodation level through extensive com-
putational studies. As previously mentioned, the partial value
revelation on the agents’ side is the main benefit of iterative
bidding compared to the direct revelation mechanism (such
as VCG mechanism). It is notable that this privacy benefit is
obtained at a scheduling efficiency cost. The iterative bidding
framework maximizes the sum of the bidding prices, and
it often terminates before agents have completely revealed
their values. Due to this, the efficiency of iterative bidding
cannot be guaranteed with the XOR bids compared to the
solutions obtained by VCG, in which user’s complete values
are revealed. This section will further explore the relationship
between computation efficiency and information revelation for
the proposed iterative bidding framework.
A. Experimental Evaluation Metrics
We start with defining the evaluation metrics:
(1) Efficiency e(s) is measured as the ratio of the value of
the final schedule s f inal in iterative bidding to the value of
the optimal schedule s∗ by solving the centralized model
e(s) =
∑
lsti,k ∈s f inal vi (lsti,k )∑
s∗ vi (s
∗)
. (21)
(2) Information revelation in f o(s) is measured as the ratio
between the sum of the final prices bid by the agents for all
latest start times in the final schedule s f inal and the true values
on start time
in f o(s) =
∑
lsti,k ∈s f inal pi(lsti,k )∑
lsti,k ∈s f inal vi (lsti,k )
. (22)
in f o(s) measures the extent to which an agent has revealed
her value for each start time during the iterative bidding, which
is computed as the average information revelation over all
agents.
(3) Running time is measured by the computing time needed
to terminate the iterative bidding and the centralized model
optimization on one problem instance.
(4) Accommodation level ac(s) is measured by the number
of agents included in the final schedule s f inal
ac(s) =
n∑
i=1
wi∑
k=0
Xi,k . (23)
B. Design of Test Data
Three groups of problem instances are generated, where the
number of agents and charging points (CPs) in each group
is configured as 6 agents with 2 CPs (Group 1), 8 agents
with 2 CPs (Group 2), and 10 agents with 3 CPs (Group 3),
respectively. The reason is that a single AC Level 2 charging
station charges averagely four EVs during a day, with around
5.6 hours connected to a vehicle per charging event [46].
The EV/CP ratio we designed for these two groups conforms
to the charging station workload in realistic scenarios. And
each group has ten random-generated test cases, including the
charging request (ati , dti , psti , cdi ), value vi (lsti,k ) and initial
bidding prices pi(lsti,k ) for the kth bid of agent i ’s bids.
The earliest arriving time ati is drawn from a uniform
distribution U(9, 11) between 9 and 11 (a.m.). The preferred
start time psti is set as ati + U(1, 2). We assume each agent
has at most five bids in XOR bid (wi ≤ 5), and the time
interval between each two adjacent latest start times lsti,k−1
and lsti,k is one hour. Therefore, the latest departure time dti
should be psti + cdi + (wi − 1). The charging duration cdi
(hour, h) is drawn from a uniform distribution α ∗ U(0.3, 1).
α = 4 is an estimate of the maximum charging duration,
which is determined by the average charging duration. Here
we consider Level 2 charge (AC, 240 Volts/40 Amps) and take
the average charging duration over 3 hours according to the
battery capacity, the level of charge and the temperature.
In centralized model, the cost function is defined
as a pairwise function of the start time sti , that is,
ci (sti ) = β ∗ (sti − psti ), for sti ∈ (psti , dti − cdi ] and
ci (sti ) = 0, for sti ∈ [ati , psti ], where β = 2. The value
for the bids is linear with the charging duration. vi (lsti,0)
(dollar, $) for the preferred start time psti is set as γ ∗ cdi ,
where γ is drawn from a uniform distribution U(2, 3). The
value for the kth bid is vi (lsti,k ) = vi (lsti,k−1) − U(2, 3), for
k = 1, . . . , wi . As for bidding price of the latest start time
lsti,k in the kth bid, it is smaller than the value by U(2, 4),
i.e., pi (lsti,k ) = vi (lsti,k ) − U(2, 4). For instance, an XOR
bid could be < Q1, 10, $10 >XOR< Q1, 11, $8 >XOR< Q1,
12, $6 >, where the $10, $8 and $6 indicate the bidding
prices for the lsti,k 10 a.m., 11 a.m. and 12 a.m. in each
bid, respectively. In order to test the effect of ε on the
efficiency e(s) and the number of bidding rounds, we set the
increment ε as 1 and 2 in these three groups.
C. Results and Analysis
The results of the iterative bidding are compared with
the centralized model optimization (the optimal schedule that
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Fig. 1. Efficiency and information revelation between the iterative bidding framework and the optimal solution. (a) Group 1. (b) Group 2. (c) Group 3.
Fig. 2. (a) Accommodation level, (b) rounds and (c) running time of the iterative bidding framework and the optimal solution.
maximizes the sum of values across all agents). The efficiency,
information revelation, running time and accommodation level
of these two approaches are tested for three different groups of
problem instances and two different increments. To guarantee
the optimality of the solutions, the centralized model and the
iterative bidding framework are coded in ILOG Optimiza-
tion Programming Language (OPL), and solved the charging
scheduling problems with ILOG CPLEX 12.6.3, as the opti-
mization engine. All experiments are carried out in a PC with
a processor of Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-7200U CPU @2.50GHz,
8GB memory.
The computational results of the three groups of the iterative
bidding framework and the centralized model are shown
in Fig. 1, including the efficiency, information revelation,
respectively. We compared the results of the optimal solution
and the iterative bidding framework in terms of ε = 1 and 2.
Moreover, Fig. 2 (a), (b), and (c) present the accommodation
level, number of iterative rounds, and running time of iterative
bidding under different ε, respectively.
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that iterative bidding can reach a
high efficiency (on average 85%) against the results obtained
by the centralized model (regarded as 100% efficiency) among
these three groups. As shown in (a) and (b) of Fig. 1, with the
same charging capacity (2 CPs), iterative bidding achieves a
similar efficiency level (around 88% out of 100%) in address-
ing Group 1 (6 agents) and Group 2 (8 agents). We observe
that the performance of iterative bidding is stable when dealing
with different size of charging requests. In addition, iterative
bidding with ε = 1 usually achieves a higher efficiency
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF TEST CASE WITH 100 EVS
compared to ε = 2 among these test cases in three groups.
With ε = 1, iterative bidding needs more rounds to terminate
with more bids submitted, given this, price updating policy
will reveal more value information of agents in each round.
Therefore, a smaller increment, theoretically, has a higher
efficiency. Furthermore, we can see that the efficiency has a
positive correlation with the information revelation level by
observing (a), (b), and (c) in Fig. 1, the high efficiency of
iterative bidding is always accompanied by a high level of
information revelation. Thus, information privacy preservation
is obtained at an efficiency cost in iterative bidding. Similarly,
iterative bidding with ε = 1 has a higher value revelation
compared to ε = 2 among these three groups.
Fig. 2 (a) reveals the accommodation level of three groups
by both approaches (ε = 1 in the iterative bidding). In some
cases the charging station is not able to accommodate all users
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TABLE IV
BIDS, TEST CASE: SET 5 OF GROUP 3 (10 AGENTS AND 3 CPS)
to charge with both approaches. The reason is the limited
charging capacity cannot accommodate all charging requests
in the final schedule. For instance, only 4 of 8 agents are
selected in set 2 of group 2, as they all require a longer charge.
Fig. 2 (b) presents the number of rounds among these three
groups, in which we can see the small increment leads to
more rounds and longer time before termination. Fig. 2 (c)
indicates that the running time increases with the number of
agents and the charging duration for both approaches. We can
see the iterative bidding takes more time to terminate than the
centralized model. And iterative bidding with ε = 1 spends
slightly more time to terminate than with ε = 2, as the smaller
increment leads to more rounds.
D. Scalability of Iterative Bidding
A larger size problem with 5 problem instances is designed
to test the scalability of iterative bidding: each with 100 agents
and 20 charging points (CPs). And the earliest arriving time ati
is drawn from a uniform distribution U(6, 12). The α in
charging duration cdi ’s distribution α ∗ U(0.3, 1) is set as
α = 2. The rest is the same as the above setting. We run
these 5 instances and take the average value of each metrics,
shown in Table III.
Since this charging scheduling problem is NP-hard,
the computational time by CPLEX increases dramatically
as the problem size (number of users and charging points)
becomes larger, as we can see above. Finding the optimal solu-
tions takes averagely 826.57s. And iterative bidding (ε = 1)
runs averagely 4950s when dealing with this large test
case, and obtains averagely 80% efficiency compared to the
optimal solution. Moreover, we observe that the performance
of iterative bidding with ε = 2 from Table III. is in line with
the results of smaller problem test cases in Part C.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studied a decentralized EV charging scheduling
problem in a charging station setting. We proposed an itera-
tive bidding framework as a decentralized solution approach
to the problem. This framework includes bids, a winner
determination model and an iterative bidding procedure. The
iterative bidding procedure allows users to progressively reveal
their values on various charging start times. Overall charging
schedules are achieved through the negotiation between the
charging station and EV users. The winner determination
model selects a subset of the submitted charging requests
that maximizes the charging station’s revenue. We present two
game theoretical properties of the iterative bidding framework,
we also conduct a computational study to validate its effec-
tiveness. Our experiment results show that iterative bidding
achieves on average 85% efficiency compared with that of the
optimal solution (revealing users’ complete values). Moreover,
we observe a positive correlation between the scheduling
efficiency and value revelation during the iterative bidding
process. Experiment results also show that a smaller bidding
price increment can achieve higher efficiency, although it
always leads to more rounds of bidding.
The proposed iterative bidding provides a potential
reservation-based charging solution for a portion of users
who have strict time requirements and private preferences in
a decentralized setting, but the acceptance and practicality
of the bidding methodology is not the focus of this paper
and waits to be verified in real-world markets. We aim to
derive and validate the bidding solutions to deterministic
single bidding event, which provides the baseline for dynamic
scenarios. The robustness against uncertainties and dynamics,
such as the changes of user preferences, or uncertain EV
arrivals, is our future work on agenda. Moreover, we will
extend this single charging station environment to multiple
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TABLE V
ITERATIVE BIDDING EXAMPLE: SUBMITTED BIDS, PROVISIONAL ALLOCATION AND SCHEDULE OF EACH ROUND
TABLE VI
RESULTS OF THE ITERATIVE BIDDING FRAMEWORK AND THE CENTRALIZED MODEL
OPTIMIZATION TEST CASE: SET 5 OF GROUP 3 (10 AGENTS AND 3 CPS)
charging stations where the coordination therein should be
carefully addressed with efficient mechanism design.
APPENDIX A
See Table IV.
APPENDIX B
See Table V.
APPENDIX C
See Table VI.
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